Judicial Interpretation in the Cost-Benefit Crucible by Siegel, Jonathan R.
GW Law Faculty Publications & Other Works Faculty Scholarship 
2007 
Judicial Interpretation in the Cost-Benefit Crucible 
Jonathan R. Siegel 
George Washington University Law School, jsiegel@law.gwu.edu 
Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarship.law.gwu.edu/faculty_publications 
 Part of the Law Commons 
Recommended Citation 
Jonathan R. Siegel, Judicial Interpretation in the Cost-Benefit Crucible, 92 Minn. L. Rev. 387 (2007). 
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Faculty Scholarship at Scholarly Commons. It has 
been accepted for inclusion in GW Law Faculty Publications & Other Works by an authorized administrator of 
Scholarly Commons. For more information, please contact spagel@law.gwu.edu. 
Judicial Interpretation in the Cost-Benefit Crucible
by Jonathan R. SiegelProfessor of LawGeorge Washington University Law SchoolForthcoming, Volume 92, Minnesota Law Review
Judicial Interpretation in the Cost-Benefit CrucibleJonathan R. Siegel
CONTENTS
Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1I.  Vermeule’s Challenge . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5A.  Vermeule’s Critique . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5B. Vermeule’s Reconstruction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7C.  Vermeule’s Prescription . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 101.  Statutory Cases . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 122.  Constitutional Cases . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14II.  Responding to the Challenge . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16A. Costs:  The Costs of Interpretation and the Inevitability of Armchair Intuition . 171.  How Big are These Costs, Really? . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 182.  How Much of the Costs Would Really Be Saved? . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 20a.  The Coordination Problem . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 20b.  Offsetting Costs . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 26B.  Benefits:  Judicial Institutional Advantages . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 30C.  The Role of Agencies . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 34D. Constitutional Interpretation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 39CONCLUSION . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 43
* Professor of Law, George Washington University Law School.  A.B . Harvard University;J.D. Yale Law School.  I would like to thank my colleague Michael Abramowicz for hishelpful comments on an earlier draft of this Article.1 ADRIAN VERM EULE, JUDGING UNDER UNCERTAINTY:  AN INS TITUT IONA L THEO RY O F LEGALINTERPRETATION (Harvard University Press 2006).  For reviews, see William N. Eskridge,Jr., No Frills Textualism , 119 Harv. L. Rev. 2041 (2006); Caleb N elson, StatutoryInterpretation  and Decision  Theory, 74 U. Chi. L. Rev. 329 (2007).2 See, e.g., Conroy v. Aniskoff, 507 U.S. 511, 519 (Scalia, J., concurring) (“The greatestdefect of legislative  history is its illegitimacy”); Antonin Scalia, Common-Law Courts in aCivil-Law System: The Role of United States Federal Courts in Interpreting the Constitutionand Laws, in A MATTER O F INTERPRETATION: FED ERA L COURTS AND  THE LA W   35 (AmyGutmann ed., 1997) (arguing that reliance on legislative history is unconstitutional); John F.Manning, Textualism as a Nondelegation Doctrine, 97 Colum. L. Rev. 673, 706-707 (1997)(arguing that the constitutional rule against congressional self-aggrandizement prohibitsreliance on legislative history in statutory interpretation); John F. M anning, Deriving Rulesof Statutory Interpretation from the Constitution, 101 Colum. L. Rev. 1648, 1650-51 (2001)(arguing that our constitutional structure compels courts to adopt the “faithful agent” modelof statutory interpretation and to reject the English practice of equitable interpretation);William N. Eskridge, Jr., All About Words: Early Understandings of the "Judicial Power"in Statutory Interpretation, 1776-1806, 101 Colum. L. Rev. 990 (2001) (arguing that theConstitution permits nontextualist interpretive practices); Jonathan R . Siegel, The Use ofLegislative History in a System of Separated Powers, 53 Vand. L. Rev. 1457 (2000) (arguingthat the Constitution permits courts to  consult legislative history, but imposes some limits onwhat can constitute consultable legislative history).3 Id. at 31 (“[C]onstitutional premises . . . mandate neither formalist interpretive methods nornonformalist interpretive methods . . . . The Constitution cannot plausibly be read to say agreat deal about the contested issues of statutory interpretation.”).
Judicial Interpretation in the Cost-Benefit Crucibleby Jonathan R. Siegel*
INTRODUCTIONWe don’t really know whether judicial reliance on legislative history orother interpretive techniques that go beyond simply enforcing plain text ishelpful, but we do know that these techniques are expensive.  Therefore,courts should reject them. That, in a nutshell, is Adrian Vermeule’s challenge to the community ofinterpretation scholars.  His new book, Judging Under Uncertainty,1 eschews,and attempts to transcend, the main elements of the long-standing debatesover methods that courts should use to interpret statutes and the Constitution.Countless judges and scholars have attempted to prove that particularinterpretive methods are constitutionally required or constitutionallyillegitimate;2 Vermeule rejects these efforts.3  Simiarly, he sees no need to
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4 E.g. Vermeule, supra  note 1, at 87 (arguing that it might be possible to “bracket” this andother high-level questions altogether, if institutional considerations show that judges should,in practice, use the same interpretive techniques under any theory of the ultimate goals ofinterpretation).5 Compare , e.g., Scalia , supra  note 2, at 16-18 (arguing that “despite frequent statements tothe contrary, [courts] do not really look for subjective legislative intent”); Frank H.Easterbrook, Text, History, and Structure in Statutory Interpretation, 17 Harv. J.L. & Pub.Pol’y 61, 67-68 (1994) (“[S]tatutory text and structure, as opposed to legislative history andintent (actual or imputed), supply the proper foundation for meaning. . . . Intent is empty. .  . .Intent is elusive for a natural person, fictive for a co llective body.”); Kenneth A. Shepsle,Congress Is a “They,” Not an “It”: Legislative Intent as Oxymoron, 12 Int’l Rev. L. & Econ.239, 239 (1992) (“Legislative intent is an internally inconsistent, self-contradictoryexpression..”) with  1 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMM ENTARIES ON THE LAW S OF ENGLAND 59(photo. reprint 1979) (1765) (“The fairest and most rational method to interpret the will ofthe legislator, is by exploring his intentions at the time when the law was made, by signs themost natural and probable.”); Patricia M . Wald, The Sizzling Sleeper: the Use of LegislativeHistory in Construing Statutes in the 1988-89 Term of the United States Supreme Court, 39Am. U. L. Rev. 277, 281, 301 (1990) (“[W]hen we are called upon to interpret statutes, it isour primary responsibility, within constitutional limits, to subordinate our wishes to the willof Congress because the legislators’ collective intention, however discerned, trumps the willof the court. . . . Congress makes the  laws, I try to enforce them as Congress meant them tobe enforced.”). 6 Blackstone’s assertion of the judicial power to depart from statutory text that dictates anabsurd result goes back to 1765 , see Blackstone, supra  note 5, at 60, and Blackstone relieson the work of Pufendorf, pub lished a century earlier.  See id.; 5 SAM UE L PUFENDORF, DEJURE NATURAE ET GENTIUM LIBR I OCTO ch. 12, § 8  (1688) (Oldfather tr.) (“[W]hen words,if taken in their plain and simple meaning, will produce an absurd or even no effect, someexception must be made from their more generally accepted sense, that they may not lead tonothingness or absurdity.”).
resolve apparently burning questions such as whether courts are bound bywhat legislatures write, or by what legislatures intend4—again distancinghimself from innumerable arguments in the scholarly literature.5  ForVermeule, everything comes down to a simple but withering cost-benefitanalysis involving two factors:  the empirical uncertainty regarding thebenefits of interpretive methods other than simply enforcing plain text, andthe costs of those methods.  Because we lack, and probably cannot hope toget, data that could tell us whether these methods move courts closer to orfurther away from any accepted interpretive goal, and because we do knowthat the methods are costly, courts should reject them.The goal of this Article is to engage Professor Vermeule’s arguments andto respond to the substantial challenge that his book represents to theinterpretation scholarship community.  In essence, Vermeule challengesinterpretation scholars to justify their allegedly sophisticated interpretiverecommendations.  For decades (indeed, centuries),6 interpretive theoristshave debated the goals of statutory interpretation and have offered
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7 Vermeule, supra  note 1, at 15-39.8 Id. at 189, 198, 202-03.9 Id. at 206.10 Id. at 230.11 Id.12 Id. at 230-31.13 Id. at 229.
innumerable prescriptions for how courts might best achieve those goals.But, Vermeule argues, scholars have neglected critical elements of theinquiry.  Scholars have naively assumed that judges might adopt their petinterpretive theories en masse and execute them perfectly.  Scholars have,Vermeule claims, neglected to consider the inevitable, institutionallimitations on judicial interpretation—limits that stem from judges’ cognitivelimitations, from the limits on their time and resources, and from eachjudge’s inability to compel other judges to adopt preferred interpretivemethods.7  No interpretive theory, Vermeule concludes, can be correct unlessit takes due account of the institutional limitations that may cause courts toerr.  Vermeule’s theory focuses almost exclusively on these limitations.The result is perhaps the most austere vision of the judicial interpretiverole ever put forward.  Vermeule argues that, in cases where statutory textimmediately at issue is clear and specific, courts should simply enforce thattext and eschew all other considerations, such as legislative history,interpretation of the statutory text in light of other statutory text, orapplication of canons of construction.8  In cases where the statutory textimmediately at issue contains an ambiguity, courts should defer toadministrative or other executive construction of the statute, without evenattempting to use traditional tools of statutory construction to resolve theambiguity.9As with statutes, so too with the Constitution.  The courts, Vermeuleargues, should enforce clear and specific constitutional texts, but shouldeschew anything beyond that.10  Where constitutional texts are ambiguous  oropen-ended, courts should let legislatures interpret them.11  Under this rule,Vermeule blandly notes, courts would cease enforcing the Bill of Rights andthe Fourteenth Amendment.  In particular, freedom of speech, due process,and equal protection would all be remitted to legislative enforcement.12A bit of a comedown for judges!  Vermeule recognizes that his proposedinterpretive methods would turn judges into rather humble functionaries13 andwould also pluck the heart out of the academic enterprise of advising judges
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14 Id. at 290.15 Id. at 229.16 Id. at 290.17 Id. at 229, 290.18 E.g., id. at 194.19 E.g., id. at 193.20 See infra Part II.A.1.21 See infra  Part II.A.2.a.22 See infra  Part II.A.2.b.23 See infra Part II.B.
with regard to interpretation.14  But, Vermeule notes, the goal is not to makejudges’ work interesting,15 nor for academics to have fun,16 but to findinterpretive methods that work best for our institutional structure, giving dueregard to the empirical uncertainties surrounding the value of variousinterpretive methods.17  His book challenges interpretation scholars to askwhether they really have any basis for believing that their favorite methodsmake interpretation better rather than worse.This Article attempts to respond to Professor Vermeule’s importantchallenge.  After summarizing Vermeule’s arguments in Part I, Part IIexamines both ends of Vermeule’s cost-benefit critique:  both the argumentthat discarding all judicial interpretive methods beyond enforcement of plaintext will result in an “enormous” cost savings,18 and the argument that thereis no way to gauge whether these interpretive techniques have any positivenet benefits.19  First, Part II.A takes on the cost side of Vermeule’s equation.It questions whether the costs of judicial interpretive methods are really as“enormous” as Vermeule would have us believe,20 and it also suggests thatwhatever the size of the costs involved, Vermeule’s theory might not resultin avoiding those costs, both because adoption of Vermeule’s theory by onlysome judges would leave the bulk of the costs in place,21 and because theavoidance of judicial interpretive costs could result in increased offsettingcosts elsewhere in the legal system.22The remainder of Part II then considers the benefit side of the analysis.This part suggests that, while no one can precisely measure the value of theinterpretive techniques Vermeule would discard, there are reasons to believethat the value is, at least, positive.  The judiciary has institutional features thatgive it a comparative advantage at detecting appropriate occasions fordeparture from statutory text,23 at checking the self-aggrandizing tendencies
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24 See infra  Part II.C.25 See infra  Part II.D.26 Vermeule, supra  note 1, at 16-17.27 Id. at 19, see 1 Blackstone, supra  note 5, at 60 (providing the famous example that a lawagainst “letting blood in the streets” should not apply to a doctor who bleeds a patient whohas fallen down in the street in a fit).28 Vermeule, supra  note 1, at 31.
of the executive,24 and at giving real content to constitutional constraints onthe legislative power.25  Because these institutional considerations suggest apositive value for judicial interpretive techniques that go beyond enforcementof plain text, those techniques cannot be discarded on the basis that, if theyoffer zero benefits, we might as well avoid their costs.I.  Vermeule’s ChallengeBefore critiquing Professor Vermeule’s theory, it seems only fair topresent it in its best light.  In compressing three hundred pages into ten, somenuances will undoubtedly be lost. Professor Vermeule’s main ideas, however,are sufficiently simple that they can be summarized briefly.  A.  Vermeule’s CritiqueProfessor Vermeule begins by criticizing prior interpretation scholarshipfor failing to analyze the institutions that carry out the interpretive process.26Ignoring this institutional structure, Vermeule says, is a fundamental error.No interpretive theory can succeed without taking into account thecapabilities of interpreters to carry it out and the social effects of givingactual interpretive institutions particular powers.A good picture of Vermeule’s critique emerges from his criticism ofBlackstone’s acceptance of the principle that courts should construe statutesso as to avoid absurd results.27  Vermeule distinguishes between “first-best,”aspirational principles of interpretation that might apply in an idealized worldand “second-best” principles that should apply in a real world in whichfallible institutions must carry out the interpretive process.  On the one hand,it might seem that everyone could agree that “absurd results are bad.”  Buteven so, Vermeule suggests, it might not follow that courts should have thepower to construe statutes to avoid absurd results—and not for theconventional, formalist reason that judicial reform of statutes constitutes aninvasion of the legislative power,28 but for different, practical reasons thattake account of the institutional capability and fallibility of courts.  If courtshave the power to avoid statutory absurdity, it is inevitable that they will
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29 Vermeule, supra  note 1, at 20, 38-39.30 Id. at 20.31 Id. 32 See HART & SACKS33 Vermeule, supra  note 1, at 26-27.34 See WILLIAM N. ESKRIDGE, JR., DYNAMIC STATUTORY INTERPRETATION (1994).35 Vermeule, supra  note 1, at 45.36 Id. at 47.
sometimes use that power incorrectly, identifying a statutory application asabsurd because the judges do not sufficiently appreciate the relevant policiesor purposes.29  The costs of mistaken exercises of the absurdity power mustbe set against the benefits of its correct use.  Moreover, judges will have todecide whether any given application of a statute is absurd, and making thisdecision will require courts to expend interpretive resources, another cost thatmust be considered.30  Finally, giving courts the power to reform statutesintroduces uncertainty into the law; parties planning their conduct mustalways consider the possibility that some court will later fail to follow theapparent meaning of statutory text on the ground that the court considers theresult dictated by the text to be absurd.  The increased difficulty of planningis another important social cost of the absurdity power.31The costs of decision, the costs of error, and the costs of planning in lightof legal uncertainty are, for Vermeule, vital institutional considerations thatmost interpretation scholarship ignores.  Vermeule criticizes prior scholarsfor assuming that judges will perfectly carry out interpretive methods.  Hesystematically surveys the main players in the world of interpretation andsubjects them to this critique.  Thus, the purposivism of Hart and Sacks,32Vermeule observes, requires judges to promote legal coherence, a fineaspiration, but one that could go awry if judges wrongly identify theprinciples and purposes to which the law is then made to cohere.33  WilliamEskridge’s theory of “dynamic” statutory interpretation34 may successfullyrefute the formalist, separation-of-powers objections to judicial “updating”of statutes,35 but it insufficiently considers whether the same objections mightbe justified on different, institutional grounds:  Eskridge does not, Vermeulesays, adequately consider whether dynamism might cause more harm thangood, because cases in which fallible judges mistakenly update statutes(because they fail to perceive the statutes’ current social utility) mightoutweigh the cases in which courts correctly exercise the updating power.36Judge Richard Posner’s early theory of “imaginative reconstruction,” whichcalled upon judges to ask what an enacting legislature would have done if
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37 Richard A. Posner, Legal Formalism, Legal Realism, and the Interpretation of Statutesand the Constitution, 37 Case W. Res. L. Rev. 179 (1987).38 Vermeule, supra  note 1, at 52-53.39 RICHARD A. POSNER, LAW, PRAGMATISM, AND DEMOCRACY (2003); Richard A. Posner,Pragmatic Adjudication, in THE REVIVAL OF PRAGMATISM:  NE W  ESSAYS ON SOCIALTHOUGHT, LAW, AND CULTURE (Morris Dickstein ed., 1998).40 Vermeule, supra  note 1, at 54.41 Vermeule, supra  note 1, at 30.42 Id. at 31-32.43 Vermeule, supra  note 1, at 63.
presented with a given case,37 similarly fails to consider the potential inabilityof judges to do the work of imaginative reconstruction well, and judicial errorin imagining what a legislature would have done could drive judges fartheraway from legislative intent than they would have achieved by anunimaginative, plodding application of the statutory text.38  Posner’s morerecent pragmatic theory,39 which views judges as “wise elders” and licensesthem to interpret statutes so as to maximize their beneficial socialconsequences, similarly fails to consider whether the costs of decision and thecosts of legal uncertainty that such a judicial power would entail wouldoverwhelm its benefits.40  Thus, Vermeule calls the interpretation scholarship community to task fordisregarding institutional considerations.  Even a formalist such as JohnManning, whose ultimate interpretive prescriptions have considerable overlapwith Vermeule’s, is criticized for reaching his conclusions on the basis ofconstitutional, separation-of-powers arguments, rather than on the basis ofinstitutional considerations.41  For Vermeule, constitutional arguments areunsatisfactory guides to interpretive practices—the Constitution, he says,mandates neither formalist nor nonformalist interpretive methods.42  Thefocus, according to Vermeule, should be on the institutional characteristicsof the interpreter.B. Vermeule’s ReconstructionInterpretation scholarship, Vermeule therefore says, must take an“institutional turn”43—it must consider the institutional characteristics of theinterpretive actors in our legal system.  For Vermeule, several of thesecharacteristics are especially salient:  judicial capacities and potential forerror, the costs of and systemic effects of interpretive methods, and thedifficulties of methodological coordination within the judiciary.
Judicial Interpretation in the Cost-Benefit Crucible 8
44 Vermeule, supra  note 1, at 86-117.45 Holy Trinity Church v. United States, 143 U.S. 457 (1892).46 Vermeule, supra  note 1, at 90-102.47 Id. at 102-03.48 Id. at 106-07.49 Id. at 105-17.
Vermeule begins by considering judicial capacities.44  He argues thatdebates over proper interpretive methods have focused too much ontheoretical considerations and have too often ignored the question of judicialcapacity to perform interpretive methods properly.  He illustrates this pointby considering the question of judicial reliance on legislative history.  Muchhas been written on the question of legislative history’s legitimacy, withformalists arguing that reliance on legislative history is constitutionallyforbidden and with intentionalists arguing that legislative history isconstitutionally legitimate and that it may provide useful insight intolegislative intent.  But all along, Vermeule claims, scholars have ignored themost vital consideration:  whether courts really benefit from, or will merelybe confused by, legislative history.  Vermeule presents a detailed critique of the famous Holy Trinity Churchcase.45  He argues that the Supreme Court, in attempting to implementcongressional intent as revealed in legislative history, in fact misread thelegislative history.46  This case study, Vermeule claims, is revealing.Although it is, of course, just a detailed look at the use of a single interpretivemethod in a single case, it illustrates the vital, general importance of takingaccount of the possibility of judicial error.47  The point of the case study is that, even on a very generous series ofassumptions in favor of legislative history—even assuming that Congressforms a collective intent about the meaning of statutory text, that legislativehistory properly reflects that intent, and that intent is the ultimate touchstoneof statutory meaning—the problem of judicial capacity may cause one toconclude that courts should not consult legislative history.48  Courts,Vermeule notes, have limited resources—there is only so much time toconsider each case.  They may not be able to properly process all of astatute’s legislative history, especially given how voluminous andheterogeneous legislative history can be.  Holy Trinity Church, according toVermeule, shows that judicial reliance on legislative history may move courtsfurther from, rather than closer to, the proper interpretation of a statute, evenassuming that legislative history would provide an infallible interpreter withthe best guide to statutory meaning.49  Courts are not infallible andinterpretive methods must be designed for real decisionmakers, not
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50 Id. at 116.51 Vermeule, supra  note 1, at 116-17.52 Id. at 118-48. 53 Id. at 119, 122.54 See Jonathan R. Siegel, The Polymorphic Principle and the Judicial Role in StatutoryInterpretation, 84 Tex. L. Rev. 339 , 385-90 (2005); Nicholas Quinn Rosenkranz, FederalRules of Statutory Interpretation, 115 Harv. L. Rev. 2085, 2144 (2002).55 See, e.g., Conroy v. Aniskoff, 507 U.S. 511, 518 n.12 (1993) (express ly justifying, inresponse to a dissent by Justice Scalia, resort to legislative history even in a case where thestatutory text is unambiguous); cf. United States v. Thompson/Center Arms. Co., 504 U.S.505,  516 n.8 (1992) (plurality opinion) (similarly justifying resort to legislative history in
hypothetical ones.50  Thus, in the end, perhaps even intentionalists shouldreject the use of legislative history, not because of any theoretical problemwith it, but because of the practical problem that its net effect may be to drivecourts further away from what intentionalists themselves claim is the goal ofinterpretation.The generalizable lesson, Vermeule says, is that many of the apparentlygreat debates in interpretive theory may be irrelevant.  Who cares whethertextualism or intentionalism provides the ultimate guide to statutory meaningif practical considerations dictate that the actual interpretive methods thatcourts should use would be the same under either theory?  If even anintentionalist would conclude that, in light of the possibility of judicial error,the net effect of the use of legislative history is to drive courts further awayfrom statutory meaning as measured by intentionalism, then intentionalistswould agree with textualists that courts should not consult legislative history.Textualists and intentionalists could thus reach practical agreement withoutresolving their larger, theoretical debate.51The other main institutional consideration that Vermeule considers is thelack of coordination within the judiciary.52  Interpretation scholars, Vermeulenotes, often offer prescriptions for “the courts” to adopt, as though thejudiciary were all governed by some Kantian universal imperative and might,en masse, adopt a particular interpretive method.53  In fact, that is not howthings work.  No judge can force any other judge to adopt particularinterpretive methods.  Indeed, perhaps somewhat curiously, even when theSupreme Court itself makes a ruling in an interpretation case, it appears toregard the ruling as having stare decisis effect only as to the particularinterpretation reached; neither the Court nor individual Justices seem toregard rulings as having stare decisis effect with regard to interpretivemethodology.54  Justice Scalia, for example, continues his notable campaignagainst reliance on legislative history even though the Supreme Court hasexpressly rejected it.55
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response to a dissent by Justice Scalia).56Vermeule, supra  note 1 , at 118 . 57 See, e.g., United States v. Taylor, 487 U.S. 326, 346 (Scalia, J., concurring in part).58 Vermeule, supra  note 1, at 135-36.59 Id. at 121.60 Id. at  121-23, 146-47.61 Id. at 149, 153.
Vermeule observes that this lack of coordination within the judiciary mayhave significant impact on the choice of interpretive methods.  In particular,he suggests that “democracy-forcing” interpretive methods—interpretivemethods that supposedly have the virtue of improving legislativebehavior—may only make things worse if some, but not all, judges usethem.56  For example, some textualists argue that courts should disregardlegislative history because doing so will “foster the democratic process” bycompelling Congress to ensure that it enacts its desires into statutory text.57Vermeule, however, observes that if some judges refuse to considerlegislative history but most judges will consider it, then legislators will expectlegislative history to be considered and will keep on using it.  Isolatedtextualist decisions will then not achieve the benefit of improving thelegislative process—and they may have the cost of missing legislative intentas revealed in legislative history.  Thus, such isolated decisions may not onlyfail to achieve their democracy-forcing result, but may actually make thingsworse.58  Vermeule calls the assumption that a method is best for one judgeif it would be best if used by all judges simultaneously “the fallacy ofdivision.”59Because no judge can force another judge to adopt a particular method,Vermeule concludes, individual judges cannot choose a method as best on theassumption that all other judges will fall into line.  Rather, each judge mustchoose a method that will be helpful to the overall judicial system even ifother judges do not choose to follow.  The individual judge’s choice will, ofcourse, not make things perfect, but, to avoid the fallacy of division, judgesmust choose methods that will at least contribute marginal benefits even ifother judges do not choose the same methods.60C.  Vermeule’s PrescriptionIn light of the institutional concerns detailed above, Vermeule concludesthat the most pressing questions in interpretation are not theoretical, butempirical.61  Scholars can endlessly debate whether the ultimate goal ofinterpretation should be to discern the meaning of enacted text or, rather, the
Judicial Interpretation in the Cost-Benefit Crucible 11
62 Id. at 85, 116-17.63 Id. at 158.64 Id. at 158-62.65 Id. at 171.
intent of those who enacted it, but what we really need to know is whetherparticular interpretive methods bring us closer to, or drive us further awayfrom, either of these goals.  If it turns out that certain interpretive methods arenot helpful in achieving any goal that anyone might posit for interpretation,then everyone could agree on discarding those methods, even withoutreaching agreement on the ultimate interpretive goals.62  The problem, then, is the empirical one of determining the actual valueof interpretive methods.  Does reliance on legislative history, for example,help or harm judicial efforts to discern legislative intent (even assuming thatdiscerning legislative intent is the right goal)?  Vermeule complains thatscholars have long relied on intuition rather than hard evidence in answeringthis question.  It is no good pointing to particular cases in which legislativehistory is helpful, he says, because, for all one knows, those cases might bemore than balanced out by cases in which use of legislative history harms theinterpretive enterprise (as he believes occurred in Holy Trinity Church).  Weneed real empirical evidence on whether legislative history and otherinterpretive tools do more good than harm overall.The problem, of course, is that there is no real empirical evidence on thisquestion, and, Vermeule notes, it may be impossible to get any, at leastanytime soon.  The relevant questions may be “trans-scientific,” that is,impossible to study empirically at a reasonable cost within a reasonabletime.63 An empirical study on the usefulness of interpretive techniques wouldalmost inevitably suffer from fuzzy categorization of cases (who would judgewhich cases reached the “right” results?), uncertainty about the relevantvariables, and the impossibility of performing direct experiments about thelong-term effects of adopting particular interpretive regimes.64 Unfortunately, judges cannot put off deciding cases until someoneconceives and executes studies that provide valid empirical data.  They mustdecide cases in real time.  What is needed, then, is a set of interpretivetechniques that are appropriate given the paucity of empirical knowledgeabout which interpretive techniques really achieve their stated goals—hence,Professor Vermeule’s title, “Judging under Uncertainty.”  Vermeule finds the answer by borrowing from “decision theory.”65  If weare uncertain about the value of various interpretive methods, decision theorytells us that, ideally, we would calculate the “expected” values of differentmethods by taking a weighted average in which we multiply the variouspossible payoffs to each method by the probability of each payoff.  The
Judicial Interpretation in the Cost-Benefit Crucible 12
66 See, e.g., Vermeule, supra  note 1, at 192 (“judges have almost no reliable information”about the reliab ility of legislative history or its effect on judicial error; its external costs andbenefits are “at best difficult to specify and at worst wholly indeterminate”).67 Id. at 173.68 Vermeule, supra  note 1 , at 176 .  I thought this was a contrived word, but according to theOxford English Dictionary it has had the meaning Vermeule mentions since at least 1956.OXFORD ENGLISH DICTIONARY (2d ed. 1989).69 Vermeule, supra  note 1, at 166-68.
difficulty, however, is that the payoffs of various interpretive methods are notonly unknown, but we do not have appropriate numbers to assign to theirprobabilities, and Vermeule claims, we cannot even make reasonableestimates.66  Vermeule therefore turns to a more radical decision technique:the “principle of insufficient reason,” which consists of simply assuming thatunknown probabilities are equal, or, to put it another way, that the good andbad aspects of the unknowable results of proposed interpretive techniquescancel each other out.67  Vermeule’s answer, in other words, will consist offocusing on those outcomes of interpretive methods that are knowable, andassuming that everything else washes out in the long run. Vermeule also notes several other decision-theoretical techniques, onlyone of which will be mentioned here:  “satisficing.”68  This technique consistsof searching among options only until one has found a choice that is “goodenough” and then abandoning any further search for a better choice.  Thesatisficer contents herself with a good choice and does not demand the bestchoice.  Armed with these techniques, Vermeule proceeds to offerprescriptions for judicial interpretation.1.  Statutory CasesFor statutory interpretation, Vermeule proposes that, where the statutorytext immediately under consideration is clear, courts should simply apply itsclear meaning and ignore all other considerations.  This conclusion followsfrom the decision-theoretical premises just noted, as applied to the actualsituation in which courts find themselves.Vermeule observes that courts, as noted earlier, lack solid empirical dataabout the value of most interpretive techniques that go beyond enforcing theplain meaning of the immediately applicable statutory text, but they are in agood position to gauge one fact about these methods:  their costs.  Courtshave a comparative advantage in assessing how interpretive methods affectlitigation costs and judicial workloads.69  Vermeule applies this insight to various interpretive techniques, startingwith judicial reliance on legislative history.  As noted earlier, judges have
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70 Id. at 193 . 71 Id. at 192-95.72 Id. at 196.73 Id. at 194.74 Vermeule, supra  note 1, at 198-99.75 Id. at 201-02.
little hard information about how reliance on legislative history affects thereliability of their decisions.  Under the principle of insufficient reason,Vermeule suggests, courts should assume that this factor washes out—that,on balance, reliance on legislative history neither helps nor harms judicialefforts to reach the correct interpretations of statutes (on any view ofcorrectness).70  But courts do know that legislative history is costly:  it isexpensive for counsel to research and for courts to consider.  In the absenceof any solid, empirical reason to believe that legislative history actually helpscourts reach more accurate decisions, courts might as well save themselvesand litigants the cost of considering it.71  In other words, in the absence of anyreal information about which alternative is best, one might as well select thecheapest.Of course, Vermeule acknowledges, minimizing costs is not the onlygoal72—we should not try to minimize costs at all costs, one might say—andit would be wrong to discard reliance on legislative history if there were nogood alternative.  But there is a good alternative—simple reliance on clearstatutory text.  Such a method is “good enough,” and this is where the ideaof satisficing comes in:  faced with a method that produces “good enough”results, courts should not adopt other methods that offer uncertain benefitsbut certain and substantial costs.73  Again, the result is to discard reliance onlegislative history.Vermeule reaches the same conclusion, for similar reasons, as to othertechniques that go beyond simply enforcing the clear statutory textimmediately at hand.  He rejects most of the “canons of construction,” againon the ground that their benefits are uncertain, while their costs are definite.74Occasionally, some default canon will be an inevitable necessity (forexample, in the absence of any express statement, statutes must either beassumed to apply, or not to apply, extraterritorially), in which case, Vermeuleasserts, courts should just pick a default rule and be done with it, butotherwise the canons should be abandoned and statutory plain text simplyenforced.75  Similarly, comparison of statutory text to similar text in otherstatutes (which Vermeule dubs “holistic” statutory interpretation) againprovides uncertain benefits, but definite costs, and should also be
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76 Id. at 202-05.77 Id. at 207-08; see Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, 467 U.S.837 (1984).  Chevron deference is most conventionally justified on the theory that anambiguous provision in a statute entrusted to an administrative agency constitutes an implicitdelegation of power from Congress to the agency to resolve the statutory ambiguity.Vermeule contends that, in fact, Congress has neither required nor forbidden courts to adoptthe Chevron princip le and that its true justification lies in the agencies’ superior institutionalability to discern statutory meaning.78 Id. at 208.79 Id. at 210-11.80 Vermeule, supra  note 1, at 230-31.
abandoned.76In cases where statutory text is not clear, but contains a gap or ambiguity,Vermeule argues that courts should defer to the statute’s administrativeconstruction.  Administrative agencies, Vermeule argues, have a comparativeadvantage over courts in assessing statutory meaning, and this is the truereason for Chevron deference.77  Agencies have specialized expertise thatputs them in a better position than courts to know the true meaning ofambiguous text, and they have no coordination problem, because each agencyis a single organ that can interpret its own organic statute.78  Courts shouldtherefore accept agency interpretations of ambiguous statutes without evenattempting to use traditional tools of statutory construction to narrow theambiguity.  For courts to use such tools just duplicates the costs of agencyinterpretation without any certainty of any corresponding benefit.  Again, costminimization is not the only goal, but accepting the agency’s interpretationis “good enough,” and doing anything more risks incurring costs with nobenefits.79 2.  Constitutional CasesTurning from statutory interpretation to constitutional interpretation,Vermeule applies the same theory. Again, he argues that courts shouldenforce those texts (here, parts of the Constitution) that are clear and specificand should leave everything else—specifically including enforcement of mostof the Bill of Rights and the Equal Protection Clause—to other officials.80Anything else, he argues once again, incurs definite costs for uncertainbenefits.Of course, Vermeule acknowledges, this rule would entail discardingsome decisions that are near to our hearts; every now and then the courtsseem to do a good job and come down with a constitutional decision that
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81 347  U.S. 483 (1954); see Vermeule, supra  note 1, at 231.82 See Vermeule, supra  note 1, at 231, 241, 281.83Id. at 258-59, 273-75. 84 Id. at 258-59.85 Id. at 275.86 Id. at 275-76.87 Id. at 265.
most people would hate to lose, such as Brown v. Board of Education.81  Butfor every Brown, Vermeule says, there is a Dred Scott—i.e., a case in whichthe courts wrongly strike down the work of the political branches.82  If courtshave the power of judicial review, they will inevitably make some bad usesof it:  there is no way to get the good decisions without the bad ones.  Thus,lovers of judicial review have to stop focusing on their favorite decisions andinstead consider the whole range of decisions.  We need to know whetherjudicial review produces, not just good results, but net good results.Vermeule again concludes that there is no way to answer this empiricalquestion.  There is no reason, he suggests, to believe that courts have aninstitutional advantage in interpreting the Constitution.83  True, Article IIIcourts are free of political pressure to conform to current majoritarianpreference, but that does not free them to come to correct constitutionaldecisions; it just frees them to do whatever they please.84  It does not makethem truer agents of the people than the people’s elected representatives.Courts that attempt to tackle ambiguous constitutional text may make errorsof interpretation, just as they do in statutory interpretation.  We cannotempirically know whether they will, on balance, do more good than harm.85But we can know, once again, that sophisticated interpretive methods arecostly.  The decision costs of constitutional interpretive methods are high(originalism, for example, requires a lot of historical research).  Moreover,judicial review adds a layer of uncertainty to the law that imposes extra costsby complicating planning.86While this aspect of his theory seems even more radical than his statutoryinterpretation prescription, Vermeule assures the reader that eliminatingjudicial review will not lead to terrible results, such as tyranny.  He notes thatsome other liberal democracies get by without judicial review.87  Thus, once again, doing anything other than enforcing clear text, andleaving the rest to other officials, incurs certain costs while yielding nocertain benefit.  Vermeule concludes that the courts’ interpretive role shouldbe as humble in the constitutional arena as it is with regard to statutes.
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88 See, e.g., Blackstone, supra  note 5, at 60; Eskridge, supra  note 2;  Jonathan R. Siegel,What Statutory D rafting Errors Teach Us About Statutory Interpretation, 69 Geo. Wash. L.Rev. 309 (2001) [hereinafter Siegel, Statutory D rafting Errors]; Jonathan R . Siegel,Textualism and Contextualism in Administrative Law, 78 B .U. L. Rev. 1023(1998)[hereinafter Siegel, Textualism and Contextualism]; Lawrence M. Solan, LearningOur Limits: The Decline of Textualism in Statutory Cases, 1997 Wis. L. Rev. 235.89 See Siegel, Statutory D rafting Errors, supra  note 88; Siegel, Textualism andContextualism, supra note 88. 90 I have always acknowledged this.  See Siegel, Textualism and Contextualism, supra note88, at 1110.
II.  Responding to the ChallengeProfessor Vermeule’s work poses a valuable and significant challenge tothe community of interpretation scholars.  Many of us, including myself, havewritten extensively about cases in which following plain statutory text leadsto the wrong result and have argued for a judicial power to reform or deviatefrom statutory text in appropriate cases.88  There is considerable debate aboutwhen a case is “appropriate” for the exercise of such a judicial power—myown theory calls upon courts to discern the “background principles”underlying the area of law of which a statute is a part and to use them as aguide, deviating from statutory text only when the text deviates sosurprisingly from background principles that departure from the text isjustified89—but some power of judicial reform is a common theme in thescholarly literature.Vermeule rightly asks those of us arguing for the existence of this powerto consider whether we really have a basis to believe that the power will, onbalance, do more good than harm.  Vermeule is surely right to observe that,once courts are granted the power to depart from statutory text, they willinevitably misuse that power in some cases.90  Therefore, for scholars toprove the value of our pet interpretive techniques, it is not enough to exhibitparticular cases in which the power of judicial departure from statutory textwill provide benefits; we must offer some reason to believe that the poweroffers net benefits in the whole run of cases, in light of the possibility ofjudicial error.Vermeule also rightly draws attention to the costs of litigation that arisefrom the need to decide whether a court should exercise the power to departfrom statutory text in a given case—a power that, most agree, should berarely exercised.  Even I, who have delighted in collecting cases in whichapplication of a strict textualism would make courts look silly, regard suchcases as curiosities.  Most of the time, as Vermeule observes, simpleapplication of statutory text leads to what all interpreters regard as the correctresult, because the other cues to which some interpreters would also look
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91 See Vermeule, supra  note 1, at 186 (noting that all interpretive methods agree that clearand specific text is the single best source of interpretive  information); Siegel, StatutoryDrafting Errors, supra note 88, at 335 n.116 (noting convergence of interpretive methodsin most cases).92 For a more detailed look at Vermeule’s precursors, see Eskridge, supra  note 1, at 2044-50.93 Conroy v. Aniskoff, 507 U.S. 511, 519 (1993) (Scalia, J., concurring) (emphasis deleted).Justice Scalia also sounded this theme in his book on interpretation.  See Scalia, supra  note2, at 36-37.94 See infra Part II.A.95 See infra  Part II.B - II.D.
(legislative history, background principles, or whatever else) only reinforcea statute’s apparent textual meaning.91  Therefore, interpretation scholars whoargue for judges to look beyond plain meaning are suggesting that courts andparties must bear the cost of engaging interpretive machinery that will makea difference only in unusual cases.  Is the game worth the candle? Vermeule is not the first to attack widely used interpretive methods on theground that they fail a cost-benefit test.92  Justice Scalia has long complainedthat judicial reliance on legislative history is a “waste of research time andink” that “condemns litigants to subsidizing historical research by lawyers”while being, “on the whole . . . more likely to confuse than to clarify.”93  ButVermeule has taken the argument to a new level, expanding it and making itthe centerpiece of an entire theory of interpretation.  Vermeule challenges usto consider whether we have erred in relying on our armchair intuitions aboutthe value of interpretive methods in the absence of real, empirical data.The remainder of this Article attempts to respond to Vermeule’schallenge.  The next section suggests that some reliance on armchair intuitionis inevitable in the choice of interpretive methods, and, indeed, that Vermeulerelies on it no less than anyone else.94  Therefore, to justify interpretivetechniques that go beyond enforcement of plain text, it should be enough toexhibit a reasonable basis for believing that the techniques have a positive netvalue, even if that value cannot be precisely gauged.  The Article thenattempts to offer institutional reasons for such a belief.95A. Costs:  The Costs of Interpretation and the Inevitability of ArmchairIntuitionProfessor Vermeule criticizes interpretation scholars for relying on theirintuitions regarding the value of interpretive methods in the absence ofempirical data.  His own theory, he believes, avoids this problem by focusingonly on those costs and benefits of interpretive choices that courts would bein a good position to gauge.  In fact, however, a closer look at the costs and
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96 Vermeule, supra  note 1 , at 194  (referring to the cost of researching legislative history); id.at 210 (referring to the cost of using traditional tools of statutory construction to reviewadministrative interpretation of statutes).97 See Vermeule, supra  note 1, at 175 (noting that invocation of the principle of insufficientreason seems most plausible when “the consideration given dispositive weight is . . . of thesame order of importance as the discarded imponderables”).98 E.g., id. at 193.99 Id.
benefits involved reveals that Vermeule is as guilty of armchair empiricismas anyone else.  He posits, without any real data, that the costs of theinterpretive methods he desires to reject are “enormous,” and he disregardssome costs of his own proposals that, for all we know, might exceed the costsavings his methods would provide.1.  How Big are These Costs, Really? A centerpiece of Professor Vermeule’s theory is his assertion thatinterpretive methods that go beyond the application of plain text (or deferenceto administrative construction of ambiguous text) entail costs that are high,indeed, “enormous.”96  Theoretically, one might say, Vermeule’s argumentdoes not depend on the size of these costs.  If one assumes (by virtue of the“principle of insufficient reason”) that the net benefits of interpretivetechniques that look beyond plain text are zero, then courts might as welljettison these techniques even if the resulting savings were very low—evena dollar of savings would beat zero dollars of foregone benefits.Still, if the costs of looking beyond plain text were really that low, wewould all be better advised to spend our time arguing about something else.Vermeule’s own notion of “satisficing” would suggest that the currentinterpretive system is “good enough”—it would hardly be worth buyingVermeule’s book if the savings resulting from his theory were less than theprice of the book, and even on a more realistic view (the costs involved aresurely more than that), the satisficer might stick with the current systemunless an alternative offers a substantial improvement.  Thus, the enticingnotion that implementation of Vermeule’s theory could provide society with“enormous” cost savings is really central to his arguments.97It is notable, therefore, that Vermeule does not attempt to quantify thecosts of the interpretive techniques he criticizes.  He notes only that otherinterpretation scholars seem to agree that the costs are high.98  But given thatVermeule criticizes these same scholars’ estimation that the costs are worthit as “empirically far too ambitious,”99 that seems a slender reed on which tohang his theory.  It is true that Professor Eskridge has said that, in his
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100 William N. Eskridge, Jr., Textualism , the Unknown Ideal? , 96 Mich. L. Rev. 1509, 1541(1998).101 Scalia, supra  note 2 , at 36-37; see alsoKenneth W . Starr, Observations about the Use ofLegislative History , 1987 Duke L.J. 371, 377 (noting that counsel must consult legislativehistory not only in litigation, but also in counseling clients).102 See International Brotherhood of Teamsters, AFL-CIO v. Federal Highway Admin., 56F.3d 242, 246-47 (D.C. Cir. 1995).103 See Vermeule, supra  note 1, at 188-89 (noting that judges may disagree about whetherstatutory language is clear).104 Pepper v. Hart, [1993] 1 All E.R. 42.
judgment, the cost of researching legislative history “involves a very largenumber of dollars,”100 but Eskridge gives no basis for this judgment. Also,Justice Scalia estimates that, when he was head of the Justice Department’sOffice of Legal Counsel, his staff spent 60% of its time researchinglegislative history.101  But if we are to make impressionistic judgments basedon personal experience, I would add that, in my own five and a half years ofexperience of litigation of statutory issues (one year as a law clerk and fourand a half as an advocate in the Department of Justice), I certainly researcheda substantial amount of legislative history, but I never felt that doing so wasa particularly grinding burden, especially relative to the overall costs oflitigation (and there was at least one time that it pretty much won the case forme,102 which seemed quite beneficial). The cost of interpretive techniques relative to the overall cost of litigationseems particularly neglected in Vermeule’s theory.  Indeed, imagine thatVermeule’s theory were fully adopted by every Article III judge tomorrow.Litigation would hardly cease.  Surely the lion’s share of litigation is overestablishing facts, not arguing about the law’s meaning.  Even argumentsabout statutory interpretation would continue.  Vermeule’s theory retains forthe courts the function of deciding whether statutory language is clear orambiguous.  Even if stripped of certain techniques, such as reliance onlegislative history or comparison of statutory text to text in other statutes,counsel will surely find things to argue about.103  The amounts involved arenot quantifiable—as noted, Vermeule himself does not attempt to quantifythem—but the thought of the amount of litigation that would remain givessome reason to doubt whether the cost savings from adopting Vermeule’stheory would truly be “enormous.”  If the whole savings would be somethingto the right of the decimal point, then the argument for incurring costs in thename of achieving the best possible methods of interpretation is strengthened.When the British House of Lords recently relaxed its rule against judicialconsideration of legislative history,104 it faced the cost question squarely.Over the “practical objection” of the Lord Chancellor that permitting such
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105 Id. at 47-48 (opinion of Lord Mackey of Clashfern, LC).106 Id. at 66-67 (opinion of Lord Browne-W ilkinson).107 Id.108 Vermeule, supra  note 1, at 121-22.109 Id. at 226.110 Id.
consideration might lead to “an immense increase in the cost of litigation inwhich statutory construction is involved,”105 the leading opinion stated that“it is easy to overestimate the costs of such research,” and that while the newpractice would “inevitably involve some increase in the use of time, this willnot be significant.”106 This opinion was, it should be noted, based on thenotion that courts would permit consultation of legislative history only inlimited cases—more limited than U.S. practice allows.107  Still, the bottomline is that experts do not agree on how large the costs of interpretivetechniques are, and no one really has hard information. 2.  How Much of the Costs Would Really Be Saved?But inasmuch as the costs of the interpretive techniques that ProfessorVermeule attacks are unmeasurable, let us charitably assume that they are, atleast, large (we need not go so far as to say “enormous”).  There are stillreasons to wonder whether adopting Professor Vermeule’s theory would leadto a savings of these large costs.a.  The Coordination Problem As noted earlier, Professor Vermeule chides interpretation scholars forcommitting the “fallacy of division”—that is, for assuming that methods ofstatutory interpretation that would be beneficial if adopted by the wholejudiciary must necessarily be good if adopted by individual judges.108Because judges cannot compel each other to adopt particular interpretivemethods, Vermeule contends that judges must adopt methods that producebenefits even if other judges do not follow their lead.  It is questionable,however, whether Vermeule’s theory satisfies this criterion.Vermeule contends that the benefits of adopting his theory are “marginal”or “divisible.”109  That is, he contends that each adoption of his theory by anindividual judge will reduce systemic decision costs and the costs of legaluncertainty at the margin.110  Of course, it may still be true that the full benefitof his theory will be achieved only when it is adopted by all, or at least most,judges, but he nonetheless perceives costs declining continuously as
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111 Although Justice Scalia cited legislative history in some of his early opinions as a Justice,e.g., Lukhard v. Reed, 481 U.S. 368, 379-81 (1987) (plurality opinion), he soon started tocomplain about the use of legislative history.  E.g., Green v. Bock Laundry Mach. Co., 490U.S. 504, 529-30 (1989) (Scalia, J., concurring).  Subsequently, Justice  Scalia carried  hiscampaign against legislative history to the point where he regularly declines to join portionsof opinions that cite legislative history, even where he joins the remainder of the opinion.See Michael C. Dorf, Foreword: The Limits of Socratic Deliberation, 112 Harv. L. Rev. 4,18 (1998).  This practice is ongoing.  See, e.g., Safeco Ins. Co. v. Burr, 127 S. Ct. 2201, 2205n.*  (2007) (noting that Justice Scalia joined all of the Court’s opinion except for footnotes11 and 15 , which discussed legislative history).112 Justice Thomas, for example, although not as doctrinaire about the matter as JusticeScalia, has occasionally joined him in rejecting the validity of reliance on legislative history.For example, he joined Justice Scalia in suggesting that the Court should not “maintain theillusion that legislative history is an important factor in this Court’s deciding of cases, asopposed to an omnipresent makeweight for decisions arrived at on other grounds.”  ThunderBasin Coal Co. v. Reich, 510 U.S. 200, 219 (1994) (Scalia, J., concurring). 113 E.g., Conroy v. Aniskoff, 507 U .S. 511, 518 n.12 (1993). 114 See Nelson, supra  note 1, at 346.
individual judges adopt his theory one by one.This argument seems incorrect.  Consider the example of the costs ofresearching legislative history.  With regard to this particular interpretivetool, we have actual experience of what it is like to have Vermeule’s theoryadopted by some, but not that many, judges.  Justice Scalia has famouslyengaged in a sustained campaign against reliance on legislative history fornearly twenty years now,111 and some other judges have signed on.112  Whatis the resulting effect on litigation costs?  Probably, none.  Consider the plight of counsel arguing a statutory case before theSupreme Court.  Counsel knows that citations to legislative history arewasted on Justice Scalia, and perhaps even on some of his colleagues.Counsel also knows, however, that a majority of the Justices have expresslystated their willingness to consider legislative history despite Justice Scalia’sscorn for it.113  So long as most of the Justices will consider legislativehistory, it seems likely that prudent counsel will research, brief, and argueit.114An actual (if admittedly crude) empirical search bears out this intuition.Lexis provides a database of Supreme Court briefs going back to 1979, so itis possible to compare citations to legislative history from the pre-JusticeScalia era to those of the present.  A search for citations to House or SenateReports in Supreme Court briefs from three five-year periods, one just beforeJustice Scalia arrived at the Court, one ten years later, and one twenty yearslater, reveals the following: 
Judicial Interpretation in the Cost-Benefit Crucible 22
115 As revealed by conducting the search DOCUMENT-TYPE (“brief”) and notDOCUMENT-TYPE (“amicus”) in Lexis’s Supreme Court briefs database, with the specifieddate restrictions.  All searches described herein were conducted the week of June 18, 2007.Unfortunately, as I learned by conducting these searches in February 2007 and  then again inJune 2007, the data in the Lexis databases seem to vary over time – documents appear in ordisappear from the Supreme Court briefs database even for years long past.  Thus, it may beimpossible to  reproduce these exact results.116 As revealed by conducting the search DOCUMENT-TYPE (“brief”) and (“H.R. Rep.” or“S. Rep.”) and not DOCUMENT-TYPE (“amicus”) in Lexis’s Supreme Court briefsdatabase, with the specified date restrictions.  Note that this search counts each brief once,regardless of the number of times a brief cites legislative reports, so its measure of theamount of citation to legislative history is obviously not perfect.117 As revealed by conducting the searches described in the last two foo tnotes, with year-by-year date restrictions.
Time Period Briefs filed byparties in theSupremeCourt115
Briefs citingHouse orSenateReports116
Percentage ofbriefs citingHouse orSenate Reports1/1/1981-12/31/1985 4,111 1,326 32.3%1/1/1991-12/31/1995 2,510 905 36.1%1/1/2001-12/31/2005 2,642 847 32.1%
If Professor Vermeule’s theory were correct, one would expect to see adecline in citations to legislative history as a result of Justice Scalia’ssustained campaign of refusing to consider it.  In fact, the rate of citations tolegislative reports increased somewhat in the early years of Justice Scalia’scampaign, and after some twenty years of the campaign the rate is virtuallyindistinguishable from what is was when Justice Scalia came to the Court in1986 (it is down, but only by a minuscule 0.1%, or 0.4% of its originalvalue).  Similarly, the trend of the rate of citations to legislative reports over allcompleted years in the LEXIS database (1979-2006)117 is almost completelyflat, as shown in this graph in which the X-axis is the year and the Y-axis isthe percentage of party briefs filed that year that cite legislative reports: 
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118 The full data set is:
Year 1979 1980 1981 1982 1983 1984 1985 1986 1987% 34.3 29.8 37.9 32.3    33.6 29.0 28.9 35.7 30.4
1988 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 199728.6 30.4 34.0 46.7 33.9 41.5 32.9 34.2 32.7 34.9
1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 200638.9 38.8 37.6 36.8 34.1 28.8 30.7 30.8 31.7
In the above table, “%” means, “percentage of party briefs citing legislative reports, as shownby the LEXIS Supreme Court briefs database.”  The linear best-fit line was calculated byQuattro-Pro.
The slope of the best linear fit to the year-by-year data over all completedyears is .00049.118  That is, the trend of the rate of citations to legislativehistory is actually positive (i.e., citations to legislative reports are increasing),but the change is so small that it seems more accurate to conclude that asingle Justice’s campaign against legislative history has simply had no impact
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119The above tables and chart consider only briefs filed by parties.  The reason for this is thatamicus briefs tend to cite legislative history at a different rate than that of party briefs (in thewhole LEXIS database from 1979-2006, 33.1% of party briefs cite legislative reports, butonly 27.1% of amicus briefs do so), and amicus briefs have been increasing (or at least, theirrepresentation in the LEXIS database has been increasing) over time:  from 1981-1985, thedatabase contains 45.0% as many amicus briefs as party briefs; from 2001-2005, it contains62.3% as many amicus briefs as party briefs.  Thus, consideration of trends in citation tolegislative reports in all briefs might reveal an apparent decrease in citation rates that couldreally just be an artifact of the increasing percentage of amicus briefs (which cite legislativehistory less) in the database.  It is therefore necessary to look only at the same kind of briefwhen doing a multi-year comparison.The overall trend in citations to legislative reports in the amicus briefs consideredas a separate group, like the trend in the party briefs, is almost completely flat.  The slope ofthe trend line is -.00056.  Thus, while this trend is technically decreasing, the effect isminuscule.   Moreover, even if one does look at all briefs, the slope of the overall trend lineis -.00020, again suggesting no impact from a single Justice’s sustained campaign againstlegislative history.Note also that the above data consider citations to legislative reports, not tolegislative history more generally.  Legislative reports are the most important form oflegislative history, see Garcia v. United States, 469 U.S. 70, 76 (1984), so it seemsreasonable to focus on them.  Similar searches for citations to the Congressional Record inSupreme Court party briefs from 1979 to  2006 reveal that the slope of the trend  line in theircitation is -.0013.  Searches for citations to committee hearings over the same period showa trend line with a slope of -.00023.  Again, these are decreases, but only negligibledecreases.  Searching for all citations to all three forms of legislative  history in party briefsfor the same period reveals a trend line with a slope of .0015—an increase, but only anegligible increase.  Thus, while different indicators could be chosen to portray a tiny increase or tinydecrease in citations to legislative  history, the data overall really suggest that Justice  Scalia’srefusal to consider legislative history has simply had no effect on the use of legislative historyby parties to Supreme Court litigation.120 Some previous studies have suggested that Justice Scalia’s campaign against legislativehistory has had a notable effect; these studies have gauged the impact by counting cases inwhich the Supreme Court itself has relied, or not relied, on legislative history.  See ThomasW. Merrill, Textualism and the Future of the Chevron Doctrine, 72 Wash. U. L.Q. 351, 355-56 (1994) (providing statistics regarding the decline in the Supreme Court’s use of legislativehistory and concluding that “in slightly more than a decade the Court has moved from aposition in which legislative history was routinely considered  in all cases, to  a situation inwhich it is considered by the controlling opinion in only a small minority of decisions. Andin most cases, it is not mentioned at all.”); William N. Eskridge, Jr., The New Textualism , 37U.C.L.A. L. Rev. 621, 656-57 (1990) (providing similar statistics).  However, the Court’sreduced reliance on legislative history less does not imply that any resources will be saved,
on the rate at which parties rely upon it.119  Of course, this is a rather crude statistical analysis that does not fullymeasure the overall cost of legislative history research.  But any data seembetter than none, and these admittedly crude data do bear out the intuition thatcounsel will not decrease their use of legislative history just becauseindividual judges or Justices stop using it.120 
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because, as the statistics presented herein suggest, counsel will still research and brieflegislative history even if the Court might not rely on it in a given case.  (Of course, someslight savings would arise from any individual judge’s refusal to consider legislativehistory—that judge’s time will be saved, if nothing else.  But given the ratio of resourcesexpended by parties to those expended by courts, this savings may be dismissed  as trivial.)121 Rosenkranz, supra  note 54, at 2144.122 See Gibbons v. Ogden, 22 U.S. 1, 158 (1824) (argument of Mr. Emmett).123 Id. at 183-86 (argument of the Attorney General).124 Professor Vermeule kindly drew my attention to this point in an e-mail exchange.125 Cf. Vermeule, supra  note 1, at 226 (denying that adoption of his theory by a critical massof judges is necessary for it to have a beneficial effect).  Another possibility, suggested to meby my colleague Michael Abramowicz, is that individual adoptions of Vermeule’s theorycould at first each produce a slight cost savings, with a  substantial savings coming if a critical
Indeed, even if a majority of the Court joined Justice Scalia indisregarding legislative history and only a minority continued to consider it,it seems likely that counsel would continue to brief and argue it, because onenever knows which votes will prove crucial in deciding a case.121  It does notseem to be in the lawyerly character to omit arguments that might provehelpful.  When counsel for the plaintiff in Gibbons v. Ogden concluded hisSupreme Court argument with a peroration that quoted from Virgil’sAeneid,122 his opponent did not simply respond, “Virgil is not authority” andsave himself the trouble of researching it; rather, he explained in considerabledetail, in a peroration of his own that extended for nearly three pages, why thequotation from the Aeneid really supported his side of the case.123  If lawyerswill not forbear to respond to a literary allusion, to a poet who has been deadtwo thousand years, it seems unlikely that they would neglect argumentsbased on legislative history that at least some Supreme Court Justices willcertainly consider.  The same would be true for arguments based on the otherinterpretive techniques that Vermeule would have judges abandon.Vermeule is probably correct that, at some point, some cost savingswould accrue from his theory even if it were not universally adopted.  If, say,eight out of nine Supreme Court Justices renounced reliance on legislativehistory, so that only one Justice was still considering it, one could imaginethat counsel might cut back on the resources that they would devote toresearching and briefing legislative history, preferring to put most of theirenergy into matters that would likely prove more productive.124  But theactual experience of having an individual Justice reject legislative historysuggests that the costs of the interpretive techniques that Vermeule disfavorswill not decline continuously as more and more judges reject them.  Rather,it would seem that a “critical mass” of judges must adopt the theory beforeit has its desired cost-reducing effect.125
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mass of judges adopted the theory.  Vermeule would then, literally, be correct that  judgescould contribute marginally to cost savings by adopting his theory, but it would be importantto  note that the savings might be trivial or small until a critical mass of judges went along.126 Vermeule, supra  note 1, at 123-25.127 This section has focused on litigation, but similar remarks would apply to the costs ofclient counseling and social planning more generally.  If counsel cannot know whether thejudges who might ultimately decide an issue would rely on legislative history, they will havelittle choice but to consider it as one factor when counseling clients and planning behavior.128 351 U.S. 192 (1956).  For a detailed discussion of this case , see Siegel, Textualism andContextualism , supra  note 88, at 1045-49.
Thus, the coordination problem to which Professor Vermeule callsattention has the potential to sap a considerable part of his theory’s benefits.Of course, this objection may seem a little unfair.  As Vermeule notes, mostinterpretation scholars do not worry about the fallacy of division; they justimagine that courts will adopt their pet theory en masse and perform itperfectly.126  The next section examines whether Vermeule’s theory willproduce cost savings under this more typical, Panglossian assumption.  Butinasmuch as the main virtue of Vermeule’s theory is supposed to be that ittakes proper account of the structure of our actual interpretive institutions, itis only fair to observe that, given the structural feature that individual judgesadopting Vermeule’s theory will lack power to force their colleagues to fallinto line, the cost savings that is the theory’s main benefit seems unlikely tomaterialize.  Even if a majority of federal judges adopt Vermeule’s theory, solong as a sufficiently large minority sticks with interpretive methods that gobeyond plain text, counsel will have to brief and argue those methods, thusincurring the resulting costs.127b.  Offsetting CostsNow let us charitably assume that the coordination problem does notbedevil adoption of Professor Vermeule’s theory.  Imagine that Vermeule’sbook captures the attention and the adherence of the whole Article IIIjudiciary.  It still seems that the cost savings of the theory is speculative.The problem is that Vermeule focuses on some costs while neglectingother, offsetting costs.  One reason that courts sometimes look beyond theplain text of statutes is that the result indicated by the plain text appearscostly.  Consider, for example, a case like United States v. StorerBroadcasting Co.128  In this well-known case, the Supreme Court consideredsection 309 of the Communications Act, which instructs the FederalCommunications Commission to consider applications for broadcast licenses.The text of the statute clearly provided that, if the Commission denied anapplication (and maintained that denial after giving the applicant a second
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129 351 U.S. at 195-96 n.5 (quoting 47 U.S.C. § 309(b) (1952)).130 Id. at 205.  The agency had denied the particular application in question on the ground thatit had previously determined by rule that it would not serve the public interest, convenience,and necessity (the statutory standard for gran ting an application) to grant a broadcast licenseto a party that already had five such licenses, and the application revealed that the applicantalready did have five.  See id. at 194 n.1, 197.131 See Siegel, Textualism and Contextualism, supra note 88, at 1045-49.132 See 351 U.S. at 202.133 Id. at 205.134 Professor Eskridge called attention to  similar costs in responding to similar argumentsfrom Justice Scalia.  See Eskridge, supra  note 100, at 1541-42.
chance), it was required to “formally designate the application for hearing,”and that “[a]ny hearing subsequently held upon such application” would bea “full hearing” in which the applicant  could participate.129  Despite this clearstatutory command, the Supreme Court approved the agency’s determinationthat it was not required to hold a hearing after denying an application on theground that the application evidently did not satisfy valid agency rulesimplementing the Communications Act.130  As I have described in detailelsewhere,131 the Court elevated background principles of administrative lawabove the dictates of statutory text:  in light of the background principle thathearings exist to resolved disputed facts,132 the Court concluded that Congressdid not intend the agency to “waste time on applications that do not state avalid basis for a hearing.”133Imagine, however, that the Court had adopted Professor Vermeule’stheory.  Under that theory, the Court would have been obliged to implementthe clear statutory text, and the agency, therefore, would have been obligedto conduct costly, pointless hearings—perhaps hundreds per year.Presumably, if the costs had been great enough, the agency would havepersuaded Congress to fix the statute, but that too entails considerable cost,because congressional time is a scarce resource.The point of this example is that a firm decision to implement clearstatutory text no matter what may save some judicial costs, but it will likelyincrease other costs.  Congress will have to bear the costs of correctingfoolish decisions resulting from following plain text.  Society will have tobear the costs of living under foolish decisions until they are corrected.134Moreover, if courts insist on following plain text no matter what, therewill predictably arise an increased cost to Congress of drafting statutes moreprecisely.  Interpretive techniques that go beyond enforcement of plain textpermit Congress to save some drafting time.  When giving any instructionsto anyone, the giver necessarily relies on a host of background interpretiveunderstandings that permit the instructions to be given in reasonably concise
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135 See William N. Eskridge, Jr., “Fetch Some Soupmeat,” 16 Card. L. Rev. 2209 (1995)(discussing Lieber’s famous example); FRANCIS LIEBER, LEGAL AND POLITICALHERMENEUTICS 18 (Roy M . Mersky & J. Myron Jacobstein eds., 1970) (1839).136 Cf. Lieber, supra note 135, at 30-32 (complaining that strict interpretive principles usedby British judges complicate the task of Parliament).137 15 U.S.C. § 1.138 National Soc. of Professional Engineers v. United States, 435 U.S. 679, 687  (1978).139 Id.; Chicago Board of Trade v. United States, 246 U.S. 231, 238 (1918).
form.135  If such background understandings are not permitted, the costs ofgiving the instructions must increase.This is a consequence that would follow in any context in whichinstructions are given. When a boss tells a secretary, “this task isurgent—finish it before you leave the building today,” the boss does not add,“but if the building catches on fire, you can leave without finishing the task.”But if the secretary insists on interpreting the boss’s instructions literally, thequalification, as well as many others, would be necessary.  Similarly, if courtsare going to follow Congress’s apparently clear instructions no matter howabsurd the result, Congress is going to have to expend more energy draftingliteral-judge-proof instructions.136Consider, for example, the Sherman Anti-Trust Act, which provides that“[e]very contract, combination in the form of trust or otherwise, orconspiracy, in restraint of trade or commerce among the several States, orwith foreign nations, is declared to be illegal.”137  As the Supreme Court haslong noted, this statute “cannot mean what it says,”138 because, if appliedliterally, it would outlaw virtually all private commercial contracts, inasmuchas restraint is the very essence of such contracts.139  Congress, however, saveditself time and energy by legislating in this broad and vague fashion andleaving the rest to judicial implementation.  If the courts had insisted onapplying the letter of the law to the absurd point of outlawing all privatecontracts, not only would there have been substantial social costs resultingdirectly from such an interpretation, but Congress would have been forced toexpend resources to overturn the decision and to craft a statute that the judgescould enforce properly.Vermeule would presumably say that these costs, assuming them to exist,should be assumed to be washed out by cost saving from his theory.  Yes,Congress will have to expend energy overturning foolish judicial decisionsthat refuse to depart from plain text, but Congress will also save energy bynot having to overturn decisions that wrongly depart from plain text.Similarly, other social actors will have to live with foolish decisionsimplementing plain text until Congress can overturn them, but will be savedthe burden of living with decisions wrongly departing from plain text.  Under
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140 Vermeule, supra  note 1, at 173-74.141 See Vermeule, supra  note 1, at 189 (“Judges can . . . hold different views about whetherstatutory language is clear.”).142 More generally, it is always possible that the interpretive techniques Vermeule rejectscould make the law easier to interpret in a given case, and thus the ir use in that case couldsave costs.  Pepper v. Hart, [1993] 1 All E.R . 42, the British case noted earlier (in which theHouse of Lords relaxed its rule against consulting legislative history), provides an example.The judges felt that the statutory text was ambiguous and that the two possible interpretationswere “nicely balanced,” id. at 69-70, but that the legislative history made the trueconstruction of the statute clear.  Id. at 70-71.  In such a case, a system that rejectedlegislative history would impose larger costs of uncertainty and litigation than one thatpermitted its use.  
the “principle of insufficient reason,” these costs and benefits should bepresumed to cancel each other out.140The principle of insufficient reason, however, is a two-edged sword.  Ifwe are to give ourselves license to imagine that unknowable quantities simplycancel one another out, the principle should be applied more broadly.  As thissection shows, adopting Professor Vermeule’s interpretive methods wouldentail a substantial and unknowable shift in costs of many kinds.  Judicialcosts, legislative costs, and other social costs would all be shifted around inimponderable ways.  If we are really to follow the principle of insufficientreason, the logical conclusion is that all of these imponderable costs andbenefits cancel each other out.Professor Vermeule would say that the judicial cost savings from histheory may properly be distinguished from all other costs, because we can beconfident of their direction and because courts are uniquely well-positionedto gauge these costs, while they are not in a good position to gauge othercosts.  But, as the previous sections in this part have suggested, it is far fromclear how big these costs are, or how much of them would really be saved.Indeed, it is not even clear that judicial time will always be saved byVermeule’s methods.  As Chevron litigation under the current system shows,there can be considerable debate over whether statutory text is clear orambiguous,141 and, under Vermeule’s theory, courts must still make thisdetermination.  One can imagine cases in which a court looking only at thetext might need to expend considerably energy deciding whether the text isclear or ambiguous, whereas other clues beyond the text might settle thematter fairly easily if they could only be consulted.142  This might not happenoften, but it could happen sometimes, and once we are in the realm ofunknowable quantities, we apparently are to imagine that the unknowablescancel one another out.
Judicial Interpretation in the Cost-Benefit Crucible 30*   *   *   *   *The point of this part overall is this:  Vermeule accuses interpretationscholars of either neglecting institutional considerations entirely, or, at best,sitting lazily in their academic armchairs and simply dreaming aboutinstitutional costs and benefits instead of realizing that they lack actual,empirical data.  But it is not clear that Vermeule himself can do any better.Vermeule offers some intuitive reasons for privileging one particular insightabout costs and benefits and then invokes the “principle of insufficientreason,” which seems to be a fancy term for “let’s ignore everything else.”But it is not clear that the costs and benefits he privileges are of the“enormous” magnitude he gives to them; it is not clear that the savings heascribes to his theory would really materialize; and it is not clear to whatdegree the savings would be offset by increases in other costs. It therefore seems that a certain amount of armchair intuition is aninevitable part of the debate in this area.  If it is good enough for Vermeule,it should be good enough for the rest of us.  Until someone gathers actual,empirical data (which, as Vermeule rightly suggests, is at best a far-offprospect), we can, and indeed must, deploy our intuitions as to the directionsof cost and benefit shifts that would result from adoption of variousinterpretive methods.  Vermeule offers one intuitive insight, which is notprovably wrong, but which is also not provably right.  The next parts of thisArticle suggest some competing insights, which at least attempt to furtherrespond to Vermeule’s challenge by offering institutional reasons as to whywe might be able to gauge the direction of benefits that accrue to currentinterpretive methods.B.  Benefits:  Judicial Institutional AdvantagesAs noted earlier, Professor Vermeule’s theory is essentially that we don’tknow whether interpretive techniques that go beyond enforcement of plaintext are any use, but we do know that they are expensive, so we might as welldiscard them and save the expense.  The previous sections questioned onepillar of this theory: the notion that an “enormous” cost savings would resultfrom discarding the interpretive techniques that he disfavors.  Instead, thisArticle has suggested, the overall cost effect is unknowable.It is now time to challenge the other pillar of the theory: Vermeule’sassertion that we cannot gauge the benefits of interpretive techniques that gobeyond enforcement of plain text.  Vermeule asserts, not just that the reasonsfor applying these techniques are less than fully persuasive, but that there isno reason to think that these techniques, on balance, do more good than harm.Vermeule says that “there is no particular reason to think that theilluminating effect of holistic textualism will predominate over its error-
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143 Vermeule, supra  note 1, at 205 (emphasis added).144 Id. at 210 (emphasis added).145 Id. at 273-74.146 Vermeule, supra  note 1, at 15-39.147 See, e.g., id . at 192 (arguing that courts are in a good position to gauge the litigation costsimposed by judicial resort to legislative history).148 See Siegel, Statutory Drafting Errors, supra  note 88, at 341-43.
producing effect”143; that “there is no reason at all to think that the tools ofjudicial gap-filling are superior to agency interpretation”144; that “[t]here isno particular reason to believe that judges are better positioned thanlegislators to update constitutional principles and rules through incrementaldecision-making over time.”145Vermeule’s assertion that we should not merely have some doubts aboutthe value of certain interpretive techniques, but that there is no reason at allto believe in them, is of the essence for his theory of interpretation.Vermeule’s appeal to the “principle of insufficient reason,” and hisassumption that that the costs and benefits of interpretive techniques that gobeyond plain text wash each other out, so that, in making a cost-benefitanalysis, we should assign them a net benefit of zero, are valid only if wereally have no basis for making any estimate of the probabilities that theseinterpretive techniques will help or harm.  Even a modest shift in theprobabilities—say, if one admitted that certain interpretive techniques mightlead courts astray in 40% of the cases, but could show that they were helpfulin 60%—would undo the fundamental “washing out” hypothesis.  Therewould then likely be some benefit from using those techniques, andVermeule’s fundamental claim, that because there is no benefit we might aswell save ourselves the costs, would fail.  In fact, this section suggests, there is at least some reason to believe thatcourts can, on balance, do better by employing techniques other than pureconsideration of statutory texts.  The reasons are institutional.  As notedearlier, one of Vermeule’s central points is that the choice of interpretivemethods should be informed by institutional considerations,146 and he permitssome elements of his overall cost-benefit analysis to be privileged (and thusexempt from the principle of insufficient reason) on the basis of what isessentially a probabilistic judgment that courts are in a good institutionalposition to gauge them.147  Therefore, it should be equally legitimate to relyon institutional reasons why courts are well-positioned to look beyond plainstatutory text in certain respects.A critical institutional consideration, which I have highlighted elsewhere,is that courts interpret statutes at the moment of implementation.148
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149 See H.L.A. HART, THE CON CEPT O F LAW 128 (2d ed . 1994).150 Justice Scalia, for  example, approves it.  See Holloway v. United States, 526 U.S. 1, 19n.2 (1999) (Scalia, J., dissenting); Green v. Bock Laundry Machine Co. 490 U.S. 504, 527-30 (1989) (Scalia, J., concurring); Scalia , supra  note 2, at 20.151 Vermeule, supra  note 1, at 20, 37.152 See id. at 173-74.153 Id. at 20.154 Vermeule expressly discusses and rejects only some interpretive techniques that gobeyond implementation of plain text, particularly, looking to legislative history, applyingcanons of construction, and “holistically” comparing statutory text to other statutory text.Vermeule, supra  note 1 , at 183-229.  Still, rejection of all techniques that go beyondimplementation of plain text is implicit in Vermeule’s overall conclusion that “[w]hen thestatutory text directly at hand is clear and specific, judges should stick close to its surface orapparent meaning, eschewing the use of other tools to enrich their sense of meaning,intentions, or purposes.”  Id. at 183 .  
Legislatures act generally and in advance.  They can never fully foresee everycircumstance to which the statutes they enact will apply.149  Courts, however,act at the moment the statutory text is actually applied to a particular case.This institutional feature of courts puts them in an advantageous position touse certain interpretive techniques.Consider, for example, the interpretive principle that courts shouldconstrue statutes so as to avoid absurd results.  Perhaps somewhat curiously,Vermeule does not definitively state what should happen to this principleunder his theory, and it is a principle accepted even by most judges andscholars who call themselves textualists.150  It would appear, however, basedon Vermeule’s arguments, that the absurd results principle would have to go.Vermeule observes that judges applying the principle may err; they mayerroneously identify a statutory application as absurd because of theirinsufficient ability to perceive the policies and purposes of the statute.151  Inthe absence of any hard data as to the rate of correct and mistakenapplications of the absurd results principle, it would appear from Vermeule’sappeal to the “principle of insufficient reason” that he would conclude therates are equal.152  Thus, he would presumably conclude that the value ofpermitting courts to apply the absurd results principle is speculative, but itscosts are definite—it increases litigation and decision costs and introducesuncertainty into the law.153  Therefore, it should be discarded.154In fact, however, there is some reason to think that courts can get netbenefits from the absurdity principle, based on the institutional feature thatthey act at the moment of statutory implementation.  Legislatures areinstitutionally disadvantaged when it comes to appreciating the potentialabsurdity of what they write.  They can do their best to perfect statutory text,but they must do all of their work prior to enactment.  No matter how much
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155 See Siegel, Statutory Drafting Errors, supra  note 88, at 341-43.156 E.g., Vermeule, supra  note 1, at 107 (noting that courts “operate under significantconstraints of time, information, and expertise”).
work they do in advance, they will make some mistakes that come to lightonly afterwards.155  Courts, however, get to see the statute afterwards, whenits absurdity may be apparent in light of the particular case in which it arises.Closely related to this point is the additional institutional feature thatcourts have time to focus on discrete statutory provisions.  Vermeule makesmuch of the limited time and attention of courts,156 which is certainly a validpoint.  But at least courts faced with an argument that statutory text dictatesan absurd result can take the time to consider and decide the argument; thereis typically no fixed deadline for a court to make a decision.  The hurly-burlyof the legislative process, and the need to vote up or down on an entire statuteon the date the statute comes before the legislature for a vote, put thelegislature in a less advantageous position to discover absurdities inindividual statutory provisions.None of this is to suggest that courts exercising the power to deviate fromclear but absurd statutory text will always do so correctly.  Once the powerof deviation exists, it seems impossible to deny Vermeule’s charge that courtswill sometimes use it unwisely.  But it does suggest that there arereasons—institutional reasons—why legislatures, even if made up oflegislators who individually are perfectly reasonable and rational, will writeabsurdities into statutory text that courts will later discover.  It suggests thatwhen a court, acting with due regard for the presumption that the legislaturemeant what it said, concludes that the legislature cannot have meant what itsaid because what it said is absurd, there is likely to be something to thecourt’s conclusion, because of the court’s institutional comparative advantagein the discovery of statutory absurdity.  And that is all one needs to show to refute Vermeule’s theory.  There isno need to quantify the exact probabilities involved.  Vermeule’s theory,particularly his invocation of the “principle of insufficient reason,” dependscritically on the assumption that judicial reliance on extratextual interpretivetechniques such as the rule against absurd results has zero net benefit, anassumption that is valid only if we assume that a judicial decision based onthe absurdity principle is as likely to be wrong as to be right.  If there is evena small excess likelihood of correct judicial implementation of the absurdityprinciple, the assertion that the principle has no benefit collapses.  We canthen no longer say that, inasmuch as the benefit of the principle is zero, wemight as well avoid the costs of implementing it; instead, we would have tocompare the costs of implementing it against its benefits, and since both areunmeasurable, we could not reject the possibility that the benefits of theabsurdity principle exceed its costs.
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157 Siegel, Statutory D rafting Errors, supra  note 88, at 326-32.158 Id. at 341-43.159 Vermeule, supra  note 1, at 27, 203-05.  This is why I have always emphasized the role ofbackground princip les in the process of statutory construction while being rather agnostic onthe legislative history question.  See Siegel, Textualism and Contextualism, supra note 88,at 1024; Siegel, Statutory D rafting Errors, supra  note 88, at 358.  I have argued that thereis no constitutional obstacle to judicial reliance on legislative history, see Siegel, supra  note2, but have not passed judgment on the argument, emphasized by Vermeule, that it is justmore troub le than it is worth, see id . at 1518-19.
This line of argument does not refute all of Vermeule’s conclusions.  Thecourts’ comparative advantage that results from their interpretation ofstatutory text at the moment of implementation says nothing particular, forexample, about the usefulness of legislative history.  It does, however,suggest that courts have a similar comparative advantage at detectingstatutory drafting errors by applying background principles of law.  As I havediscussed at length elsewhere, the absurdity principle does not do a sufficientjob of describing the circumstances in which courts should deviate fromstatutory text, because a statutory provision may be erroneously draftedwithout producing an absurd result.157  Again, however, the fundamentalinstitutional fact that courts interpret statutes at the moment ofimplementation puts them in a good position to detect startling deviationsfrom background understandings that escaped detection in the legislativeprocess.158  This suggests that courts can likely produce net benefits by usingthe process of statutory construction so as to maintain some degree ofcoherence with background principles of law, contrary to Vermeule’sconclusion.159In sum, Vermeule goes too far in asserting that there is no reason to thinkthat courts can add value to the interpretive process by considering the needfor departures from plain text.  There is some reason, and the reason stemsfrom institutional features of courts.  The features do not come with hardnumbers attached, but neither does Vermeule’s own reasoning.C.  The Role of AgenciesSo far, this Article has considered only what Professor Vermeule calls“Type 1” cases, that is, cases in which the statutory text immediately at handis clear and specific.  In “Type 2” cases, in which courts must applyambiguous statutory text, Vermeule advises courts to defer to administrativeor other executive construction of the statute, without even using traditional
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160 Vermeule, supra  note 1, at 227-28 (exhibiting Justice Kennedy’s plurality opinion in KMart, Corp. v. Cartier, Inc., 486 U.S. 281 (1988), as a model of appropriate judicialmodesty).161 Id. at 207-08.162 Id. at 208-212.163 See Siegel, Textualism and Contextualism , supra  note 88; Siegel, Statutory DraftingErrors , supra  note 88.164 See 28 U .S.C. §  1295 (giving the Federal Circuit exclusive jurisdiction over all appealsin patent cases).165 Vermeule, supra  note 1, at 208.
tools of statutory construction to try to resolve the ambiguity.160  As notedearlier, Vermeule rejects the formal, conventional justification fordeference—that ambiguous agency statutes constitute an implicit delegationof power from Congress to the agencies to resolve the ambiguities.161  Rather,he relies on practical, institutional considerations:  agencies are betterpositioned than courts to understand the meanings of the statutes theyadminister, and judicial use of traditional tools of statutory construction toreview an agency’s interpretation would just entail duplicative costs and addto legal uncertainty without offering any likely benefit.162Vermeule is surely onto something here.  If, as I have argued at lengthelsewhere,163 the background principles of any area of law are the necessaryguide to construing statutes within that area, then it makes sense to desire thatstatutes be construed by those with the best understanding of thosebackground principles.  Agencies, like courts, have the institutionaladvantage of construing statutes in the course of their implementation, socourts gain no edge over agencies there, and agencies have the furtheradvantage of specialized subject-matter expertise.  Putting aside exceptionssuch as the Federal Circuit (which, because of its specialized jurisdiction,might be expected to know as much about patent law as the Patent Office),164agencies will know more about their organic statutes, which they administeron a daily basis, and be better able to discern the background principlesunderlying those statutes, than courts, any one of which would encounter anagency’s statute only sporadically.  Moreover, as Vermeule observes, eachagency is a single organ that can produce a unified construction of its organicstatute, whereas (again with exceptions such as the Federal Circuit) numerousdifferent courts may be called upon to review the agency’s construction, andthe process of producing a coordinated judicial interpretation is rather clumsyand inefficient.165Thus, it might seem that those who preach the virtues of backgroundprinciples as a guide to statutory interpretation would be the most enthusiasticsupporters of Professor Vermeule’s proposed regime of strong deference to
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166 See Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, 467 U.S. 837, 843-44(1984) (discussing express and implicit delegations of power to agencies).  167 See id. at 844 (discussing the practice of giving deference in cases in which “a fullunderstanding of the force of the statutory policy in the given situation has depended uponmore than ordinary knowledge respecting the matters subjected to agency regulations”).168 E.g., id. at 865-66 (suggesting that it is appropriate for courts to let agencies resolvestatutory ambiguities because agencies are more politically responsive than courts).169 United States v. Mead Corp., 533 U.S. 218 (2001); see Vermeule, supra  note 1, at 215-23.170 533 U.S. at 241 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (noting that the agency construction must be theagency’s “authoritative” construction of the statute).171 Vermeule, supra  note 1, at 222.
agency interpretations, and Vermeule is certainly right about one thing:  aproper understanding of the basis for deference to agency interpretations isessential to determining numerous rules about the scope of such deference.The Supreme Court has gotten itself rather tangled up as to the rulesgoverning deference to agency interpretation, in part because it has neverquite resolved the basis for such deference.  The “delegation” theory appearsto be the conventional understanding,166 but the Court’s opinions, includingChevron itself, also offer some support for the theory that deference finds itsbasis in the agency’s superior expertise,167 as well as for other possibletheories.168  As Vermeule observes, a court that believed that the basis of deferenceis the agency’s comparative expertise in understanding its organic statutecould never have come down with the recent Mead decision, which limitedthe availability of Chevron deference depending on the form of the agencyaction involved.169  If courts defer to agency constructions simply because theagency is more likely to understand the statute than the court, then the precisecircumstances of how the agency arrived at its construction should beirrelevant.  All that should matter, as Justice Scalia argued in dissent, is thatthe court be sure that the agency’s construction is the agency’sconstruction.170  A better understanding of the role of agency expertise injustifying Chevron deference would have avoided this opinion, whichVermeule rightly criticizes.171Thus, there is much to be admired in Vermeule’s institutional analysis ofdeference to agency interpretations.  Still, Vermeule’s analysis gives too littleweight to the essential institutional point of checks and balances.  Once again,the courts’ institutional position gives them a vital role to play in statutoryinterpretation that cannot be properly fulfilled by applying Vermeule’s theory.Vermeule gives only passing attention to the role that separation ofpowers considerations should play in the choice of interpretive methods.  He
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172 Vermeule, supra  note 1, at 209-11.173 Id.174 Id.175 See Authorization for Use of Military Force, Pub. L. 107-40, 115 Stat. 224 (2001);Congressional Research Service, “Presidential Authority to Conduct Warrantless ElectronicSurveillance to Gather Foreign Intelligence Information,” (Jan. 5, 2006); Press Release,White House, Press Briefing by Attorney General Alberto Gonzales and General MichaelHayden, Principal Deputy Director for National Intelligence (Dec. 19, 2005).176 Pub. L. 107-40, 115 Stat. 224 (2001).
takes note of the political insulation of courts,172 but considers it only inrelation to the courts’ interpretive capabilities, and he does not believe itgives courts any comparative advantage over agencies in that regard.Politically responsive agencies, he suggests, will be closer to the legislativeprocess and more familiar with a statute’s original purpose than courts, andbetter able to discern those purposes from legislative history.173  The politicalinsulation of courts frees them, Vermeule acknowledges, from the pressureto construe statutes in accordance with current majoritarian desires, but thatdoes not mean they will do better than agencies at understanding a statute’soriginal meaning; it just means that courts can do what they please, whichmight or might not have any relation to the original meaning of or intentbehind a statute.174In offering such a stingy view of the courts’ potential value, Vermeulegives too little weight to a vital role that the courts play in our tripartitegovernment system, that of checking the executive.  This role arises notmerely from the courts’ political insulation, but from their status as a separatebranch of government that does not participate in the primary formulation orexecution of policy.  If that role were removed, executive agencies wouldhave a greatly enhanced ability to set the limits of their own power.  Theexecutive has a strong tendency to aggrandize its own power even with courtsplaying the role that they play now; one shudders to think what would happenif the courts did not play a checking role. To see this, consider, as just one of countless possible examples, thecurrent administration’s assertion that Congress’s Authorization for Use ofMilitary Force (AUMF), enacted after September 11, 2001, authorized thePresident to order warrantless electronic surveillance of U.S. persons withinthe United States.175  The surveillance controversy provides a goodillustration of what would happen under Vermeule’s interpretive theory.  ThePresident’s claimed statutory authority, the AUMF’s simple statement thatthe President is “authorized to use all necessary and appropriate force”against those who planned, authorized, or committed the 9/11 attacks,176 isless than perfectly clear.  Because the statute contains a gap or ambiguity,
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Vermeule’s theory would require the courts to defer to the executive’sconstruction, without even considering traditional canons of statutoryconstruction, such as the canons that the specific controls the general,177 orthat repeals by implication are disfavored,178 which might support theconclusion that the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act still governsdomestic electronic surveillance.179Of course, Vermeule would argue that for every case in which the courtscorrectly overturn the executive’s construction of a statute, there will beanother case in which the courts do so wrongly, and so the benefits of judicialreview will be offset by its costs.  To continue with the AUMF example, thecourts might rightly prevent the executive from invading civil liberties, butthey might just as well wrongly prevent the executive from engaging insurveillance that is necessary to prevent terrorism.  With no basis forbelieving that the courts will do any better than the agencies at understandingcongressional instructions, the principle of insufficient reason (Vermeulewould say) would suggest that good and bad court decisions will cancel eachother out, so we might as well save ourselves the litigation costs of generatingsuch decisions in the first place.Again, however, institutional considerations suggest that we can at leastpredict the sign of the value of judicial review of agency interpretations, evenif we cannot estimate its exact magnitude.  The critical institutionalconsideration here is the natural tendency of the executive to aggrandize itsown power.  The judiciary’s comparative advantage arises not solely from itspolitical insulation, but from its removal from primary policy formulation andimplementation.  The executive is motivated in part by its desire to give itselfthe broadest powers that will permit the maximum implementation of itspreferred policies.  The judiciary  cannot wrest the primary policy role fromthe executive; all it can do is check the executive’s tendencies.  It isrestrained, moreover, by the principle that the judicial role is only to reviewthe executive’s action for legality and is not to formulate the policy evenwhere the executive has acted illegally.  While the judiciary will not performits function perfectly, we can expect that, more likely than not, it will serveas a valuable counterweight to the executive’s natural self-aggrandizingtendencies.180  
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As the previous section explained, to defeat Vermeule’s application of theprinciple of insufficient reason, we need only some reason to believe thatmaintaining the judicial role will be more beneficial than harmful.  We do notneed to prove that the judiciary will be perfect.  The natural tendency of theexecutive to aggrandize its own power provides a sufficient reason to believethat there would be a cost to letting the executive have a totally free hand inthe interpretation of any statute that is less than perfectly clear, and this is asufficient ground for desiring to incur the costs of maintaining the judicialrole.D. Constitutional InterpretationProfessor Vermeule’s theory of statutory interpretation could conceivablyattract some adherents; his theory of constitutional interpretation seemsunlikely to do so.  Vermeule himself recognizes that this part of his theorywill strike many as “beyond the pale.”181  Still, he rightly offers the samechallenge to constitutional theorists as to statutory interpretation scholars:can we really know that judicial review produces, not just some good cases,but net benefits overall?  Once again, it is necessary to offer at least someinstitutional reasons to believe that judicial review does more good thanharm.In a recent book chapter, I suggested some such reasons.182  The chapterprimarily questioned the degree to which the political question doctrineshould restrain judicial review, but most of the arguments apply equally inresponse to Professor Vermeule.  As with statutory interpretation, there areinstitutional reasons to believe that judicial review offers net benefits even ifwe cannot quantify those benefits precisely. Perceiving these institutional reasons requires looking beyond the primaryinstitutional feature of the courts that is usually mentioned in discussions ofjudicial review, and the one upon which Vermeule primarily focuses—thecourts’ insulation from politics that stems from the constitutional guaranteeof life tenure and salary protection for federal judges.183  Vermeule rejects thenotion that political insulation puts courts in a better position than politicalactors to interpret the Constitution.  Yes, it frees them from majoritarianpressures, but that, Vermeule says, does not give them any motivation to
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interpret the Constitution correctly; it simply frees them to do as theyplease.184However, the institutional advantage of the judiciary with regard toconstitutional interpretation lies not only in the judiciary’s politicalinsulation, but also in a whole constellation of institutional features that makethe judiciary the best positioned branch to give constitutional guarantees realmeaning.  To see this, consider the way in which Vermeule suggests thatconstitutional guarantees (other than those that are quite clear and specific)be enforced:  by the political branches themselves.  Vermeule suggests thatthe legislature can be trusted just as well as judges to enforce theConstitution, and he notes that “even on the crudest model of legislators asreelection maximizers, legislators will enforce constitutional rules if that iswhat constituents demand.”185  Thus, Vermeule envisions that politicalpressures will play a role in constitutional enforcement.  Vermeule draws onLarry Kramer’s suggestion that the Framers envisioned the Constitution’sbeing enforced “as a result of republican institutions and the citizenry’s owncommitment to its founding document.”186There are, however vital institutional reasons to question whether such asystem of enforcement can properly give meaning to constitutionalguarantees.  The judicial process is well-suited, and the electoral andlegislative processes are ill-suited, to performing this function.  The reasonlies not just in political responsiveness, but in numerous characteristics of thedifferent processes.Consider a person or group desiring enforcement of a constitutionalprovision that would, under Professor Vermeule’s theory, not be judiciallyenforceable—say, the Free Speech Clause.  What is such a person or groupto do?  In Vermeule’s world, the only available enforcement mechanismwould be political agitation, which could take place either in the electoral orlegislative arena.  Both of these, one would quickly discover, lackinstitutional features that would be critical to making the Free Speech Clausea meaningful guarantee of rights.First, consider the possibility of trying to correct an alleged violation ofFree Speech rights through the electoral process.  Such a program would faceenormous practical problems.  The violation might be a minor one that wouldnot likely gain much traction in any electoral campaign.  Even if it were moresignificant, the costs of engaging the political process would surely outweighthe cost of bringing a lawsuit by a very considerable multiple.  Inasmuch as
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Vermeule’s theory is driven largely by cost considerations, this point seemshighly significant.Beyond these practical points, however, there are crucial theoretical,institutional differences between the electoral process and the judicial processthat make the latter much better suited for the enforcement of constitutionalguarantees than the former.  First, the judicial process is focused: partiescome to court with a specific claim of right and the court can issue a rulingon that precise claim.  Elections, by contrast, are the very opposite.  Even ifa constitutional issue played a role in an election (say, because a politicalgroup was attempting to defeat political candidates who supported what thegroup viewed as unconstitutional legislation), the constitutional issue wouldbe just one of the dozens of issues that always come into play in any election.Elections are not referendums; they do not provide a focused mechanismthrough which voters can express their preferences on constitutional issues.187Moreover, even if voters managed to use an election to defeat politicianswho supported allegedly unconstitutional legislation, the result would still notreally provide good enforcement of constitutional guarantees, because itwould be impossible to say that the election had established anyconstitutional rule.  Elections have the institutional feature that they areinscrutable.  They yield only a result, not a statement of reasons.  One couldsense that constitutional issues played a role in a politician’s defeat, but onecould never really be sure; perhaps the politician would have lost anyway.The judicial process, by contrast, provides a statement of reasons for itsdecisions.188  These statements of reasons can truly establish constitutionalprinciples.Moreover, the electoral system does not operate within a system ofprecedent.  Because elections yield only a result and provide no statement ofreasons, it would be impossible for voters to follow the precedent set byelections, even if they wanted to.  Even assuming a constitutional issue wereinfluential in a particular election, the issue would have to be fought outafresh with each election cycle.  The judicial process, by contrast, operateswithin a system of precedent.Finally, although it is not the only point, some consideration must begiven to the fact that the electoral process is, of course, majoritarian.Politicians who take action that might violate constitutional guaranteespresumably do so because they believe they will gain a political advantage.189
Judicial Interpretation in the Cost-Benefit Crucible 42
190 Vermeule, supra  note 1, at 274.
If the politicians correctly detect the popular mood, they may prevail despitethe unconstitutionality of their actions.  The electoral process could hardlyserve as a good institutional mechanism for putting certain matters beyondmajoritarian control; the judicial process at least has the potential to do so.Thus, there are several institutional reasons why the electoral processseems a poor vehicle for enforcement of constitutional guarantees.  But thisdoes not end the analysis.  One must also consider the possibility of enforcingconstitutional guarantees, not simply at the ballot box itself, but through thepolitical process more generally.  Even legislators who do not fear electoraldefeat over a particular constitutional issue might desire to placate a groupthat feels strongly about it.  Thus, the legislative process might provide avehicle for enforcement of constitutional guarantees even if the electoralprocess itself does not.Again, however, there are important institutional reasons to suspect thatthe legislative process will be inferior to the judicial process in this regard.The legislative process might avoid some difficulties with the electoralprocess:  it has at least some potential to be more focused and lessinscrutable.  A particular constitutional issue could be brought to an up-or-down legislative vote.  But this is not always true; constitutionally doubtfulprovisions might appear in the same bill as other, vitally needed matters, andthe vagaries of the legislative process might never allow a vote on thedoubtful provisions independent of the bill as a whole.  The legislature mightvote for the bill as a whole because its overall virtues outweigh any doubtsabout the constitutionality of a particular provisions.  Thus, the legislativeprocess, like the electoral process, might lack the focused nature of thejudicial process.  Also, the legislative process is majoritarian in nature andseems unlikely to be a good mechanism to enforce restraints onmajoritarianism.Also, the legislative process does not operate within a system ofprecedent.  One Congress can always undo what a previous Congress hasenacted.  Vermeule makes the interesting argument that the legislativeprocess may, if anything, have a stronger tendency to respect precedent thatthe judicial process, because the legislature at least has formal requirementsfor changing the law from the status quo (it must pass a new bill through thebicameral process), whereas the judiciary has no formal restraint onoverruling its past decisions.190  Still, the judicial process operates within anethic whereby precedent ought, at least, to be respected over time, whereasit is regarded as altogether appropriate for a legislature to repeal previousstatutes, or to enact statutes that a prior legislature declined to enact, even iffor no other reason than that its membership has changed.  Like the electoralprocess, therefore, the legislative process seems a poor structure for the
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establishment and enforcement of constitutional guarantees.Even more important, the legislative process lacks a critical feature of thejudicial process that elections do provide.  Elections, for all their difficulties,are, at least, mandatory:  they occur at constitutionally specified intervals.The judicial process, similarly, provides a mandatory mechanism forresolution of claims of constitutional right.  As Chief Justice Marshallremarked in Cohens v. Virginia, “[t]he judiciary cannot, as the legislaturemay, avoid a measure because it approaches the confines of the Constitution.We cannot pass it by, because it is doubtful.”191  Courts must respond toconstitutional claims, perhaps rejecting them on their merits, of course, butnot ignoring them altogether.The legislative process, by contrast, is not invokable as of right.Disgruntled citizens can complain to the legislature that a statute violatestheir constitutional rights, but they cannot compel the legislature to vote ontheir complaint.  The legislature may simply ignore the issue indefinitely.  Thus, in considering the institutional features of courts in relation to theirsuitability to conduct judicial review, it is not just the political insulation ofcourts that matters.  That is an important feature, to be sure.  As noted in theprevious section, the separation of the judicial power from the politicalbranches enables the courts to check the political branch’s natural self-aggrandizing tendency.  But there is more to it than that.  The whole range ofinstitutional features of the judiciary contributes to the suitability of courts asimplementers of constitutional guarantees.  The fact that the judicial poweris focused, that it is mandatory, that it provides reasons for its decisions, andthat it operates within a system of precedent, all contribute to having a systemin which constitutional guarantees are meaningful.  The electoral andlegislative processes do not offer these features.192Thus, again, while one must concede that the power of judicial review canbe used for ill as well as for good, there are institutional reasons to believethat it offers net benefits.  Once the process is seen to offer some likelybenefits, Vermeule’s argument fails.  One can no longer argue that inasmuchas the expected net benefits are zero, we might as well eliminate judicialreview and save its costs.  CONCLUSIONProfessor Vermeule’s book offers a useful challenge to muchconventional thinking about the judicial role in interpreting statutes and theConstitution.  Formal, theoretical arguments have dominated the debate, with
Judicial Interpretation in the Cost-Benefit Crucible 44many scholars focusing on questions such as whether the Constitutionrequires courts to follow certain rules of interpretation, or whether theultimate guide to statutory meaning is found in statutory text or in legislativeintent.  Vermeule offers a shift in thinking and makes the intriguingsuggestion that those battling over interpretive theories might, in the end,agree on interpretive methods, thus rendering the theoretical debatesirrelevant, if only they would focus on the ways in which the institutionalfailings of courts might interfere with ideal implementation of interpretivetheories.  Vermeule rightly challenges those who call upon courts to employallegedly sophisticated interpretive techniques and to depart from statutorytext in some cases to offer reasons to believe that these methods will not onlyproduce superior results in isolated cases, but will, on the whole, do moregood than harm.However, this Article has suggested, in considering whether such reasonscan be offered, Vermeule has not considered a sufficient range of institutionalfeatures of the courts.  The courts’ political insulation, to which he adverts,is certainly an important feature, but it is by no means the only importantfeature that has implications for the courts’ role in interpretation.  The timingof judicial action, and particularly the fact that courts interpret statutes at themoment of implementation, implies that they have an institutional advantagein the detection of cases in which departure from statutory text is appropriate.The courts’ separation from the primary role in formulating andimplementing policy puts them in a good position to check the self-aggrandizing tendencies of the political branches.  And a range ofinstitutional features of the judicial process—that it is mandatory, that it isfocused, that it provides reasons for its decisions, and that it operates withina system of precedent—make it a superior choice for the enforcement ofconstitutional norms.  
